Professor Jiang, speaking from Toronto, analyzes the imminent US war on Iran, arguing that while the US possesses overwhelming military superiority, Iran holds significant strategic advantages that make an American victory far from certain. He draws on historical patterns, geopolitical theory, and game theory to assess the conflict’s likely trajectory, identifying three major unknowns that will determine the outcome.
The US Strategy for Regime Change
The US approach to Iran follows a well-established three-pillar strategy previously applied in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, which Jiang describes not as regime change but as the destruction of a society’s collective capacity to function as a nation.
Pillar 1: Decapitation of leadership — removing the entire ruling elite from power, as seen in Iraq’s “de-Baathification,” which dismantled the skilled administrative class and triggered lasting sectarian violence.
Pillar 2: Economic sabotage — using sanctions and infrastructure destruction (water, electricity) to make normal life unlivable and generate revolutionary pressure from within.
Pillar 3: Sectarian division — exploiting ethnic and religious minorities by promising them a better life, thereby fragmenting national unity.
Jiang summarizes this strategy as bombs, propaganda, and money: military force to destroy opposition, Western media (CNN, BBC, New York Times) to frame the war as promoting democracy, and financing of internal dissent and opposition groups.
He argues this strategy is already being applied to Iran, likely having operated covertly for years.
Why Jiang Believes the US Strategy Will Fail in Iran
Geography works against the US: Iran is three times the size of Iraq with mountainous terrain, making sustained air strikes far less effective at destroying infrastructure.
Propaganda has lost credibility: Western media outlets have little credibility even among Western domestic audiences, and even less inside Iran.
Iranian national identity is a powerful unifying force: Iranians see themselves as heirs to a 5,000-year Persian civilization, which Jiang says creates a deep motivational reservoir for resistance and national unity that was absent in Iraq, Libya, or Syria.
Iranians have learned from Iraq’s fate: They witnessed the destruction of a once-functioning society and are unlikely to be persuaded by American promises of democracy and prosperity.
Iran’s Strategic Flexibility vs. American Vulnerabilities
The US has only one real path to victory: decapitate the leadership, foment internal revolution, and rally minorities against the regime. Iran, by contrast, has multiple ways to inflict pain on the US and its allies.
Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities: Desalination plants (the sole source of fresh water, which would be exhausted within two weeks if destroyed) and oil fields are both highly exposed to Iranian proxy attacks, particularly via the Houthis.
Strait of Hormuz: Iran can close this chokepoint, disrupting not only oil flows to East Asia but also revenue for American allies including Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar.
American military bases across the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) become legitimate military targets once war is declared.
Domestic American fragility: The American public does not support this war, and Jiang argues consumers are unlikely to tolerate the high oil prices and inflation that prolonged conflict would produce.
Iran’s counter-strategy of decentralization: Rather than relying on a centralized command, Iran has developed distributed militias and cells embedded throughout the country, meaning that even if the leadership is decapitated, the US cannot occupy and control Iran without a full ground invasion.
The Three Major Unknowns
Unknown 1: Assassination of the Supreme Leader — The US is reportedly investing heavily in this objective. The Supreme Leader’s son is the designated successor but is widely seen as unpopular and incompetent. His death could either fracture Iran or, conversely, rally the population. Jiang considers this potentially the most consequential variable.
Unknown 2: Russia’s response — Putin has withdrawn Russian advisers from Iran and remained publicly quiet, which Jiang interprets as deliberate ambiguity. He believes Putin is positioning himself as a behind-the-scenes power broker and may be setting a trap for the US.
The trap: if the US commits ground troops, initial successes (beachheads, forward operating bases) would create a surge of patriotism and media enthusiasm, but the offensive would quickly bog down due to overstretched supply lines and attacks from decentralized militias.
This would trigger a sunk cost fallacy: unable to admit failure after such investment, the US would pour in more resources it doesn’t have, potentially requiring a draft, sparking Vietnam-era-style domestic protests, and possibly leading to civil conflict — the only scenario in which America truly “loses.”
Jiang believes Putin understands this dynamic and is engineering conditions to push the US toward exactly this outcome.
Unknown 3: China’s response — China sources one-third to one-half of its oil from Iran and would face severe economic and geopolitical consequences if Iran fell under US control. However, Jiang predicts China will remain largely absent from the conflict.
China lacks a coherent grand geopolitical strategy or theory of its place in the world, unlike the US (Mackinder/Heartland thesis) or Russia (offensive defense against invasion).
China’s primary concern is regime survival through non-engagement in external conflicts, a lesson embedded in its history (the Great Wall as both barrier against outsiders and insiders leaving).
Even if the US conquers Iran and forces China to pay several times more for oil, China would absorb the cost rather than risk destabilizing the Communist Party through foreign entanglement.
At most, China might supply limited armaments but would not intervene to the degree Iran would want.
On the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Jiang considers nuclear use highly unlikely for two reasons:
It would destroy American credibility and authority globally, undermining the very purpose of the war, which is to reestablish US hegemonic legitimacy after damage from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Even without public statements, Putin has likely communicated through back channels that Russia would retaliate if nuclear weapons were used, and Jiang believes the escalation threshold for nuclear use is far too high to be reached in this conflict.
Analytical Framework
Jiang credits his accurate predictions to game theory, an analytical model he plans to teach to his audience over the coming months as the war unfolds.
He has set up a Discord server called “Predictive History” to build a community for discussion and plans to host live Q&A sessions to guide followers in developing a game theory mindset for analyzing global events.
He notes that YouTube censorship constrains what he can say publicly and is considering moving to Rumble for greater freedom of discussion.
